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Abstract
We use a version of the Melitz (2003) model to calibrate the magnitude and impact of the
border effect, the well-known empirical regularity that trade is much lower across a national
border than would otherwise be expected. We calibrate total bilateral trade frictions as a
parameter and show that frictions between nation states are systematically higher than those
between sub-national states or regions. Using plausible counterfactual analysis, we assess
the costs of independence for Scotland, Catalonia, & the Basque Country: the intellectual
experiment that is performed is to suppose that the region on independence takes on the
calibrated frictions of a counterfactual independent country. If the main change that comes
with the independence of regions of larger countries is that their border with their former
union partner comes to resemble a normal country border, then the trade costs of the break-
up of countries into smaller states (even within the EU) are significant. The border effects
associated with membership of the European Union or otherwise, are much lower than the
border effect differences between countries and regions. As an illustration of this we produce
a potential quantification of the trade costs of a British exit from the EU. Conversely, the
potential gains from the European Union achieving the sort of integration seen within a nation
state, a United States of Europe, are very large.
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1. Introduction
Across Europe there is political momentum behind secessionist movements and some desire to
achieve the creation of smaller states within the European Union.1 Given this background, it is
important to understand the differences in the level of economic integration that is entailed by
sharing a country or nation state, compared with the integration that comes with membership of a
supra-national organization like the European Union. What are the welfare consequences of these
degrees of economic integration?
Using a structural model, this paper documents that there are large differences between na-
tional and regional borders (i.e. borders between entities within a country or nation state2) in
terms of how frictional these borders seem to be for trade flows. We implement a framework
that can quantify these frictions. We use counterfactual exercises to show that the differences
between regional and country borders have important welfare effects. We ask what would be the
consequences of regions taking on country level frictions, and countries taking region level frictions.
It is important to remark upon two things that we do not do in this paper. We do not provide
an explanation for why frictions are different between countries and regions - we simply document
these differences, and look at the effects of these differences disappearing (in either direction).
Also, we do not look at the correlation (or lack thereof) of country size and income.
Whilst measurement of the difference between trade frictions of national and regional borders is
a contribution to the economic calculus of a decision for or against independence, there are many
other contributions to the costs and benefits of size, and there are many other considerations
beyond economics.3 We abstract from all these issues and simply document the frictions across
regional and national borders, and quantify the ceteris paribus welfare consequences of replacing
regional borders with country borders and vice versa. This paper should not be read as implying
a judgement upon the desirability or otherwise of independence of regions.
In order to quantify the value of the trade links that come from an integrated economy with
a larger market, we consider the application of new trade theory, following Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), Melitz (2003) and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) (ACR). Trade
benefits can arise for many different underlying reasons, for example: a love of variety means that
the available product range expands with the size of the market and leads to aggregate increasing
returns to scale, as in Krugman (1980); a larger market can lead to better firm selection as
1Scotland has a referendum on independence from the United Kingdom due to be held on the 18th of September
2014. The governing parties in the Spanish autonomous community of Catalonia have proposed that a referendum
on Catalan independence be held on the 9th of November 2014. There is a long standing independence movement in
the Basque Country of Spain. In Belgium, political disagreements between Flemish and Walloon parties prevented
the formation of a national government for 18 months in 2010 and 2011.
2In this paper we label Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country as regions, and the UK and Spain as
countries. This is a point of nomenclature rather than any point that should be interpreted politically.
3E.g. the costs and failures that may arise from overly distant government under union (e.g. Alesina, Spolaore,
and Wacziarg (2005)); the costs of “race to the bottom” fiscal competition (with independence); and other sources
of economies and dis-economies of scale.
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efficient firms expand to serve this larger market, putting upward preassure on wages, and lowering
profitability of low productivity firms who exit, as in Melitz (2003); and traditional Ricardian
trade explanations as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(2012) show that for all “gravity models” of trade, the microfoundations underlying gains from
trade, conditional on the value of the elasticity of trade flows to trade frictions, do not affect the
calibrated value of these gains. Therefore without loss of generality, we can select a specific model
to work with.
We develop a model that under some parameter restrictions falls within the class where the
ACR formula for determining the gains from trade applies. In that case the numerical procedure is
straightforward, and our contribution is simply to measure frictions across countries and regions,
and to propose counterfactual scenarios and view its consequences within a wide class of well-
understood models.
Nevertheless, under some parameter values of interest the ACR formula for gains for trade does
not apply. In these cases the specificities of the model become more relevant and the numerical
procedure is considerably more involved. Thus, our contribution extends to view the effects of
trade frictions within a class of models that allows for capital transfers across economies.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the empirical evidence that shows
the extrordinarily high integration of regions relative to the independent countries of the EU. This
evidence is the stylised fact that needs an explanation: why do the trading patterns of regions not
look like the trading patterns of independent countries? Our answer is that regional borders are
much “thinner” than country borders. Section 3 outlines the version of the Melitz (2003) model
that we use. In section 4 we claim that regional borders and country borders do indeed look
systematically different. In section 5 we measure the cost of regional borders becoming national
borders by conducting a series of counterfactual experiments, substituting the borders of Scotland,
Catalonia and the Basque Country have with the rest of the UK or Spain respectively, with the
borders between the UK or Spain (respectively) and their closest independent trading partners. In
section 6 we consider the impact of membership of the European Union, where our counterfactual
exercises do not suggest the existence of a strong effect from membership upon trade with the EU.
We evaluate a British exit from the EU by incorporating the small change in borders that this
analysis suggests. In Section 7 we measure the benefit of country borders within the EU becoming
regional borders by conducting the counterfactual experiment, substituting the national borders
within the EU by reduced versions of themselves based on the observed regional borders. Section
8 concludes.
2. Openness and Trade Concentration
European regions, viewed as if they were independent countries, appear to highly integrated
into the global economy. They have high imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Comparing
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(a) Trade:GDP ratio of OECD countries, plus Scot-
land, Catalonia & Basque Country
(b) Herfindahl Index of Trade Concentration of EU
countries, plus Scotland, Catalonia & Basque Coun-
try
Figure 1: Trade and trade concentration in regions and countries
trade to GDP for Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country against the equivalent figures for
the OECD countries (figure 1a) shows that these regions are open economies, but not outrageously
so, and there are other small countries in the OECD which have similarly high trade shares4.
However, the trade of these regions is very concentrated with the rest of the country of which
they are part: in all 3 cases, a high proportion of the total external trade is with the rest of
UK/Spain rather than internationally. In order to quantify these trade concentration facts, we
construct a Herfindahl Index of trade concentration5.
Figure 1b highlights how anomalous these regions’ trade concentrations are compared with
independent countries in the European Union. It shows the Herfindahl index against GDP on
the x-axis, since we may expect small countries to trade more, and concentrate this trade with
their large neighbours. We would expect regions to have relatively high index values, as they are
relatively small, but not nearly as high as we observe. The regional Herfindahl Indices are much
higher than that of the most trade concentrated independent EU member6: it’s almost an order
of magnitude type comparison.
The data is suggestive of high trade, concentrated with the rest of their country, being an
artifact of current institutional arrangements contingent upon being part of the same country.
The conclusion of the calibration exercise undertaken in this paper is that regions concentrate so
much of their trade with the rest of the countries of which they are part because their calibrated
bilateral frictions are much lower than the normal frictions between independent countries. The
4The data used in this section, and throughout the paper, is described in Appendix A
5If there are N countries, with the exports from country i to country j denoted Xij (X
i
i ≡ 0), then the Herfindahl
Index for country i, Hi =
∑N
j=1[(X
i
j/
∑N
k=1[X
i
k])
2]. Hi = 1 indicates complete concentration of trade with a single
trading partner. Hi → 0 (equality only possible with infinitely many possible trading partners) indicates complete
diversification of trade across all partners.
6The most trade concentrated independent EU member is Austria, a relatively small country which concentrates
its trade with the EU’s largest economy, Germany.
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status of these regions as open economies is a function of the close integration with the rest of
their countries and should not be automatically expected to survive in the long run after achieving
independence.
3. Model
We develop a version of the standard Hopenhayn-Melitz model of firm heterogeneity and in-
ternational trade. We model the world as consisting of N economies indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
These economies use a common currency (i.e. the nominal exchange rate is 1), but the purchansing
power of this common currency can be different in the different economies. In each economy there
are identical Dixit-Stiglitz consumers. Thus, the demand for any good from economy i, is given by
the demand function: q =
(
p
Pi
)−θ (
Yi
Pi
)
, where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods,
p is the nominal price of the good , Pi is the price aggregator for economy i, q is the quantity
of the good demanded in economy i, and Yi is the nominal income in economy i.
3.1. Model Description
The supply side of the model consists of infintesimal, monopolistically competitive, firms which
take the demand for their goods from each economy in the world as given. There is a fixed cost
for creating a firm, and existing firms pay a fixed cost per period to operate in each economy that
is linear in the size of that economy. The operating profit of being active in an economy depends
positively on that economy’s demand, and depends negatively on the trade frictions between the
economies of production and sale. A lower friction has positive effects at the macro level because:
it increases the number of firms serving an economy; and it improves the quality of the firms that
produce in that economy, as the more productive firms increase labour demand in order to export.
This increases wages, and drives unproductive firms out of the market.
The life cycle of a firm consists of the following stages:
A potential firm in i chooses whether to hire c˜ units of labour locally, and incurr the
fixed cost, c˜Wi, to draw some productivity from a known distribution, φ ∼ Pareto(k, b)
(so that F (Φ) = 1− ( b
Φ
)k
), which is common across all economies. Wi is the prevalent
nominal wage in country i.
If it pays that cost, it receives a productivity, φ.
If this productivity is large enough it goes ahead with production in one or more markets.
Otherwise, it disappears.
Firms die exogenously with a fixed probability, 1− β, every period.
The only input is labour and production technology is constant returns to scale subject to fixed
market access costs. The productivity of a firm from i selling in j is φ/δij, where φ is idiosyncratic
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to the firm and δij is the trade friction experienced by firms in i selling to consumers in j. These
trade frictions reflect how much easier it is to sell into a domestic market than to sell into a foreign
market; and they have the following properties:
Trade frictions are defined relative to domestic selling costs i.e. δii = 1,∀i
We assume that trade frictions are positive i.e. δij > 1, j 6= i
This formulation is isomorphic to the standard iceberg costs concept, with the quantity
of the good that “melts in transit” being, τ ij = 1− 1/δij
We do not impose symmetry in trade frictions i.e. δij 6= δji in general, though we do for
some of our empirical exercises.
δij measures the advantages than a local producer has versus a foreign producer if both have the
same intrinsic quality φ. It will be increasing in all the contributions to trade barriers: geographic
distance, language differences, regulatory differences, differences in consumer tastes and prefer-
ences, as well as, presumably, many other factors. We do not try to explain where it comes from
- we simply use a structural model to measure it. This article is a measurement exercise in the
absence of any definitive theory as to the full list of explanatory factors, and their relative con-
tribution, which determine this economic distance. If we had a theory of distance, we would use
it. Our point is to measure trade frictions in the context of the model, make comparisons and to
undertake thought experiments.
All production occurs in the firm’s local labour market: the firm hires local labour at a nominal
wage rate of Wi per unit of effective labour. The firm chooses its price, p, to maximise its nominal
operating profits for selling into each distinct market. The fixed costs, per unit time, of running
a firm in i that sells in market j, is the cost of hiring a labour force of fixed size to deal with
the expenses associated with access to this market. These expenses depend on both the size of
the market that it is going to be served, Yj/Pj, and the trade frictions experienced by the firm
in accessing this market, δij. The larger the market, the more complex it is to sell there (and the
larger the reward). The more distant the market is, the more complicated it is to sell there. The
quantity of effective labour necessary to deal with these access expenses is assumed to be:
f ij = c× δij ×
Yj
Pj
(cost parameter, c, is equal in all economies)
The per period net profit, labour demand and value of sales, for a firm in i, from selling to
market j are:
piij(φ) =
[
Θ
(
φ
δij
)θ−1(
Wi
Pj
)−θ
− cδij
]
Wi
Yj
Pj
Lij(φ) = (θ − 1) Θ
(
φ
δij
)θ−1(
Wi
Pj
)−θ
Yj
Pj
+ cδij
Yj
Pj
rij(φ) = θΘ
(
φ
δij
)θ−1(
Wi
Pj
)1−θ
Yj,
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where Θ = (θ−1)
θ−1
θθ
.
Profits and labour demand are increasing in productivity, φ, and market size, Yj. A firm from
i will choose to operate in j only if its operating profit from that market exceeeds its fixed cost for
that market. That is, only if its productivity is high enough or the distance low enough:
piij(φ) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ φ > Φij =
( c
Θ
) 1
θ−1
(
δij
Pi
Pj
Wi
Pi
) θ
θ−1
Φij is the threshold of quality of a firm from i to operate in j. In matching the model to
real world data we are claiming that all observed firms exporting from i to j have an intrinsic
productivity larger than Φij. Φ
i
j will be larger (and hence we will observe a higher average quality
for exporting firms) if: (i) the frictions experienced by firms in i exporting to j are larger; (ii)
labour in i is more expensive; and/or (iii) the real exchange rate Pi/Pj is larger
7.
Notice that the threshold Φij is independent of the size of both markets, in particular it is
independent of the size of j. This because of our assumption that the fixed costs are linear in
market size. This assumption simplifies the analysis enormously, but further, we believe that it is
the correct assumption given the purpose of our exercise. The assumption of fixed costs linear in
size ensures that the relative size of two economies is irrelevant if their trade frictions equals one.
If this were not the case then there would be huge implications for the effect of size upon economic
activity. A trade friction of 1 between two economies essentially means that the border is just a
line on the map with no real meaning, and we want our model to be invariant to such lines on the
map. This requires fixed costs be linear in size.
We assume that Φii acts as an existence threshold level of productivity
8 i.e. those new firms
who draw a productivity φ < Φii choose not to produce anything. Notice further that firms that
do choose existence (i.e. φ > Φii) may still make a realised loss, because their positive profits may
not be sufficient to cover their sunk creation costs. The realised value of creating a firm in country
i is given by:
V i =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
N∑
j=1
piij(φ)
)
−Wic˜ =
∑N
j=1 pi
i
j(φ)
1− β −Wic˜
piij(φ) is as previously defined for φ ≥ Φij and is equal to zero for φ < Φij. Notice that, since the
lowest threshold of activity is to operate in the domestic market, all exporters also sell domestically,
but not vice versa.
7Pi/Pj is the rate of exchange rate for goods sold in j in terms of goods sold in i. Given that the marginal
utilities of money in i and j are respectively 1/Pi and 1/Pj , then Pi/Pj is the relative value of money in j with
respect to i. A high value for Pi/Pj means that it is less attractive to sell to j instead of i: if Pj is low relative to
Pi, then the price of your good in country j will necesarily be low - otherwise you do not sell much in j.
8This is the δij > 1, j 6= i assumption. Strictly this threshold productivity level is min{Φji} over all j. This
general formulation leads to complicated existence conditions. We short-circuit this complexity by assuming the
simple case and checking the resulting calibrations. It turns out that the measured frictions under the simple model
always satisfy the assumption used to derive it and so we never need to complicate the calibrations.
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3.2. Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions are that (i) the value of creating a firm equals zero, (ii) labor
demand equals labor supply and (iii) that all income must be spent and there must be a balance
of payments in all economies.
Since perfect financial markets drive the expected value of firm creation to zero, the nominal
value of goods production in economy i must equal payments to labour in economy i, SiWi.
Consumers in economy i spend some amount Yi on goods, and the difference between labour
income and goods expenditure in economy i, Ti = SiWi − Yi, is some (exogenous) capital account
or factor payment made by economy i into world capital markets. Balance of payments across the
world implies that
∑N
i=1 Ti = 0.
For some of our exercises it is important to take into account the values of Ti. Due to the
redistributive role of the state, a relatively rich region within a country (say, Catalonia within
Spain) pays a fiscal transfer to the rest of the country. In order to treat the region as a country is
important to cancel such a transfer, as it would not happen in case of independence. We do so by
exogenous altering the value of Ti. As we see bellow the assumptions we make on Ti determine if
our model is in the ACR class or not.
The following result characterizes the equilibrium:
Result 1. The (unique) steady state equilibrium of the model is described by the following system
of equations:
Di ≡
N∑
j=1
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)1−µ
Yj (1)(
Wi
Pi
)−µ
Di
Pi
=
c˜ (1− β)
cbk
( c
Θ
)µ
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
µ (2)(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
Si = cMi
Di
Pi
(3)
N∑
j=1
X ij = SiWi = Yi − Ti (4)
N∑
j=1
Xji = Yi =
N∑
j=1
cMj
Wj
Pj
(
Pj
Pi
δji
)1−µ
Yi
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)−1
(5)
where µ ≡ k θ
θ−1 . Di, the effective demand or market potential for economy i, is defined by Equation
(1). Equation (2) comes from financial market equilibrium, Equation (3) from labour market
equilibrium, and Equations (4) and (5) from goods market equilibrium.
This defines a unique mapping from parameters
{
Si, δ
j
i , Ti, c˜, b, c, θ, β, k
}
∀ij into endogenous
variables
{
Xji ,Wi, Pi,Mi, Yi
}
Proof: See Appendix B
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Result 2. The following gravity equation holds for any combination of parameters:
lnX ij = ln (SiWi) + lnYj − lnDi + (1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)
(6)
Proof: See Appendix B
Model Solution
From Equation (6), we can immediately see that the elasticity of exports to variable trade
costs is 1−µ. This is the “trade elasticity” which Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012)
show is the crucial parameter for the calculation of welfare impacts of changes in trade flows. We
fix the parameters that make up the trade elasticity with reference to the economic literature.
We take the elasticity of substitution, θ, from the literature and follow the procedure that others
have followed in determining the pareto distribution parameter, k. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003) (BEJK) select a θ of 3.79 to match the size and productivity advantage of US firms
that export9. Many papers use θ = 3.8 following BEJK, see e.g. Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Davis
and Harrigan (2011), and Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007).
Some papers calibrate k to match the standard deviation of log domestic sales in the US
(as found by BEJK). See e.g. Davis and Harrigan (2011) (k = 3.4), Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
(k = 3.4), Demidova (2005) (k = 3.3), Felbermayr and Jung (2011) (k = 3.3). The Standard de-
viation of log firm sales in this model is given by (θ− 1)/k.10 BEJK produce a simulated value of
the stdev of log firm sales based on US data of 0.84, therefore conditional on θ = 3.8, our model
requires k = 3.3 in order to match this value.
Using θ = 3.8 and k = 3.3 implies a trade elasticity, 1 − µ = −3.47. This is very close to the
estimate of −3.41 made by Simonovska and Waugh (2013) for the Melitz model. All the results
quoted in the main text are made using θ = 3.8 and k = 3.3. In Appendix D we also provide
bounds on the quantifications produced by also using the extreme values estimated by Simonovska
and Waugh (2013) of −2.81 (estimated assuming a BEJK model), and −5.21 (estimated assuming
an Armington or Krugman model).
It turns out that all the other parameters of the model can be ignored since they can be
eliminated by a change of variables (see Appendix B for the proof of this claim). The model is
used in two different ways. First we calibrate the trade frictions, δij, and effective labour supplies,
Si; and then we perform counterfactual exercises varying these values.
If Ti = 0, ∀i, then the model is within the class of models characterised by Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012). This means that calibration is easy and follows directly from data,
bilateral trade flows and GDPs (see Appendix A), and from Equation (6) - see Appendix C.
9Though in BEJK markups (and not productivity) are drawn from a pareto distribution, so the shape parameter
used in their paper is not applicable.
10See Appendix B for proof of this claim.
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If Ti 6= 0 for some i’s, then we are not in the class of models characterised by Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) - models in this class satisfy several macro-level restrictions,
the first of which is that trade in goods is balanced. For some of our analysis it is important to
consider Ti 6= 0, in particular in relation to changes in fiscal transfers that would be expected in
the event of constitutional change.
In the Ti 6= 0 case, we perform the calibrations by imposing data {X ij, (SiWi), Yi, Ti, Di},∀i, j ∈
{1, ..., N} (see Appendix A) and solving for the equilibrium of the model in which the unknowns are
{Si,Wi, Pi,Mi, δij}, ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. This is a total of N(3 +N) unknowns - which is more than
the number of conditions that we have so long as N > 2. However, it turns out that trade frictions
have a transitive property (see Appendix B) that allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the
problem to 5N unknowns, {Si,Wi, Pi,Mi, δi}. The 5N − 1 equations (2) - (6) plus normalisation,
P1 = 1, can therefore be solved using numerical techniques (see Appendix C).
We perform the counterfactual policy experiments by proposing a set of bilateral trading fric-
tions, effective labour supplies, and capital flows {δij, Si, Ti},∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., N} and solving for the
equilibrium of the model with the 5N unknowns {Yi,Wi, Di, Pi,Mi} using 5N equations (equations
(1) to (4) give us 4N equations, and equation (5) gives us N − 1 equations11, and normalisation,
P1 = 1, gives a final condition). The system can therefore be solved using numerical techniques
(see Appendix C).
4. The bilateral trade frictions of countries and regions
We now use the model to measure the bilateral trade frictions between countries and between
regions. We divide the world into a ’Rest of the World’ aggregate, and the individual economies
in the OECD (see Appendix A for details of the construction of this dataset). We want to look at
the distribution of bilateral trade frictions between countries of the OECD (or between countries
of the EU). It can be shown (see Appendix B) that the measured frictions between economy a and
economy b do not depend upon how C, the set of other economies in the world, is aggregated i.e. C
could be a single entity labelled ‘the rest of the world’ or it could be the entire set of other individual
countries, it makes no difference to the measurement of δab or δ
b
a. We also use US, Canadian and
Spanish inter-regional trade in goods (only) data (again see Appendix A) to disaggregate the
US, Canadian and Spanish economies (for which we have data on international trade in goods and
services) into the regions of these federations, and so also observe the distribution of bilateral trade
frictions between the regions of the US, Canadian and Spanish federations. The results of this
are shown in Figure 2. This shows that bilateral region-region frictions are generally lower than
bilateral country-country frictions, and that there is a negative relationship between the GDPs of
the entities and the measured trade frictions between them.
11Since balance of payments in N − 1 economies combined with overall balance imples balance in the other
economy.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot showing bilateral trade frictions against GDP split by countries and regions
Extra home bias in trade in services
The use of goods only inter-regional trade makes comparison between regional and country
level frictions appear less stark than it actually is, and so is a conservative basis for conducting
this comparison. We have used the ratio of, say, Ontarian goods trade with the rest of Canada to
its goods trade with the rest of the world, combined with the Ontarian share of Canadian goods
trade with the rest of the world, to generate a consistent measure of Ontario’s internal trade, from
Canada’s external goods and services trade. This is a reasonable method to use to proxy internal
trade, but it will understate internal trade if there is more home bias in trade in services than in
trade in goods. We have this data for the Canadian Provinces and for the three regions which we
consider in the following section: Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country. Table 1 shows the
ratio of internal trade to international trade if we consider only trade in goods, and if we consider
trade in goods and services.
Every single region displays more home bias in its trade in services than it does in its trade
in goods. Therefore, assuming that this is also true of the US states and the other Spanish
Autonomous Communities, then differences between regional and country level frictions is actually
higher than presented here.
A further case for the conservatism of the comparison that we do, is that sales across a border
are more likely to be recorded and so we may expect any data quality issues to bias our results
against finding a significant differences between regional and country level frictions.
10
Region Goods Only Goods & Services
Newfoundland 63% 89%
Prince Edward Island 104% 167%
Nova Scotia 71% 107%
New Brunswick 55% 80%
Quebec 44% 64%
Ontario 26% 41%
Manitoba 78% 118%
Saskatchewan 78% 106%
Alberta 49% 68%
British Columbia 48% 72%
Yukon 122% 192%
Northwest Territories 57% 108%
Nunavut 147% 296%
Scotland 136% 179%
Catalonia 126% 135%
Basque Country 74% 94%
Table 1: Ratio of internal to international trade for each region
Characterising the distribution of regional and country level bilateral
trade frictions
Figure 2 showed a negative dependence of measured trade frictions on GDPs of the trading
partners. In an abstract, symmetrical version of the model, we can prove (see Appendix B), that
for the same underlying trade frictions, larger entities are measured as having lower trade frictions.
In this stylised model, we quantify a range that the negative relationship between size and frictions
should fall in. The slopes observed in Figure 2 do indeed fall into this range. To ensure that we
have a consistent measure of bilateral trade frictions that is uncontaminated by the size of the
parties involved, we must control for the size of the parties when comparing frictions. We do this
by showing adjusted frictions where the average slope of the log friction to log GDP relationship
estimated over the OECD countries, has been used so that they all express the equivalent notional
friction as at the same GDP (figures 3a and 3b).
i.e. for i, j ∈ OECD, regress: ln δij = β0 + β1 lnYiYj + ij
Then ∀i, j define: ln δadjij = ln δij − βˆ1(lnYiYj − lnY¯ Y¯ )
In order to be conservative, we use the observed slope, βˆ1, for countries rather than the (steeper)
observed slope for regions, when constructing the adjusted frictions.
The data are noisy and it does not seem reasonable to give equal weight to economically
unimportant observations like the bilateral flow between Iceland & New Zealand, or between
Yukon & Nunavut, as to economically important observations like the bilateral flows between
USA & Germany, or between Ontario & Quebec. To deal with this, we weight the trade frictions
by their share of overall trade within the appropriate grouping, giving each observation a weighting
factor Xij/
∑
j
∑
i 6=j Xij
12.
12Using this weighting scheme seems appropriate since it is the weighting that would be used to calculate average
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(a) Empirical CDF of adjusted bilateral trade frictions between economies
of OECD, EU, US States, Canadian Provinces, and Spanish Autonomous
Communities
(b) Weighted average adjusted bilateral trade friction between of OECD,
EU, US States, Canadian Provinces, and Spanish Autonomous Commu-
nities
Figure 3: Frictions between countries and between regions
From Figure 2 it is clear that regions have lower frictions than countries conditional on size.
In Figures 3a and 3b we can see that there is almost first order stochastic dominance for region-
region adjusted trade frictions compared with country-country adjusted trade frictions13. The
mean country-country adjusted trade frictions are well above the mean region-region ones. This
is despite the fact that for both, regions and countries, we have compared trade frictions between
entities that are spread across continental areas: the physical distances within the EU are less than
those between US States or Canadian provinces.
losses actually incurred in trading through these frictions. The production in i that is sold to j but which melts in
transit due to iceberg losses is τ ijX
i
j = (1− 1/δij)Xij . Therefore the average iceberg cost, τ¯ is the mean value of τ ij
when observation i, j is weighted by Xij/
∑
j
∑
i6=j Xij .
13Not first order stochastic dominance for Canadian provinces only because of low trade frictions between Czech
Republic & Slovakia, Hungary & Slovakia, Belgium & the Netherlands, and Estonia & Finland.
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Figure 4: Weighted average adjusted bilateral trade friction between US States, Canadian
Provinces, and Spanish Autonomous Commuinities, where we can compare estimate for the Cana-
dian Provinces generated using the goods only data as per Figure 3b, and using goods and services
data.
Based on this evidence, we claim that region-region borders are systematically less frictional
than country-country borders. As described in the previous section, this is based on a conservative
calculation given the excess home bias in trade in services. To provide some quanitification of this
degree of conservatism, Figure 4 shows the mean adjusted frictions for Canada calculated both
using the goods only data of Figure 3b and now also using the interregional goods and services
data. This substantially lowers average frictions and widens the countries versus regions gap.
5. From regional borders to country borders
The previous section gives us the empirical result that region-region borders are systematically
less frictional than country-country borders. This motivates our exercise: we will change the
frictions between an independence seeking region and its current union partner, to those that
pertain between the union and its current least frictional independent trading partner. All other
calibrated values will be kept constant in this counterfactual exercise. Implicitly, we are supposing
that the independence seeking region’s border will come to resemble a normal country-country
border, albeit one between close neighbours.
We do not try to capture transition dynamics because in the short and medium term it is
difficult to guess the degree of interaction, as two forces operate in different directions. The
process of separation may be expected to create tensions which would reduce the interactions
between the former partners. On the other hand, history must have built strong links that may
persist for some time. We do not know how long this transition period will last14. Therefore we
14A recent example that may shed light on the dynamics of the development of country level border frictions
is the Czech Republic and Slovakia case. This is a recent case and did not involve a war, following the so-called
“Velvet Divorce” of 1993. As referred to in footnote 13, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are still very close trading
13
focus solely on long run steady state. Further, focussing on this transition would require a view
of all the aspects of the economic calculus of independence. We only measure the ceteris paribus
cost of the border becoming like that of a normal country-country border and say very little about
any other expected changes upon independence, other than controlling for large and fairly certain
changes in the capital account that are explained by fiscal transfers.
Counterfactual exercises
The first stage of this is to identify the current least frictional trading partner of Spain (as a
counterfactual for both Catalonia and the Basque Country) and the UK (as a counterfactual for
Scotland). We do not claim that this represents the trade frictions that the independence seeking
region will ultimately attain, merely that, given the data, it is plausible to propose that this is the
case. We do not propose this counterfactual as a prediction, but as a benchmark of what other
independent countries look like in trade terms. We do this by first running the simple regressions:
lnXi = α + lnYi + i
where Xi is the average of imports and exports to and from Spain or the UK with country i and
Yi is the national income measure (see Appendix A). The independent country that is chosen as
the counterfactual for the independence seeking region is the country with the highest residual
in these regressions. As shown in figures 5a and 5b, these countries are Portugal and Ireland
respectively. The fact that Portugal and Catalonia, and Ireland and Scotland, are similar in size
is helpful given the dependence of measured trade frictions upon sizes. When we come to the
quantification exercises, these size considerations will mean that the quantification for Scotland is
fairly unaffected by this issue given the similarity in size of Scotland and Ireland, and rUK15 and
UK. However, the quantification for Catalonia’s costs on independence could be underestimated
due to this issue because although Catalonia and Portugal are similar in size, rSpain in this case
is substantially smaller than Spain (smaller entities need a larger δ to model a given underlying
trade friction). Likewise, the Basque quantification may underestimate the loss due to this issue
because although in this case rSpain is similar in size to Spain, the Basque Country is substantially
smaller than Portugal.
We do not choose Portugal or Ireland because they are geographically close to Spain or the
UK, but because they trade a lot with Spain and the UK. We do not make any claim on why
partners with very low border frictions, however, data from the IMF Direction of Trade statistics shows that the
share of bilateral trade in total trade fell dramatically between 1993 and 2003, with the share of total Czech exports
going to Slovakia going from 22% to 8%, and the share of total Slovakian exports going to the Czech Republic going
from 42% to 13%. This is not likely due to the opening of trade with the rest of the world following the fall of the
Iron Curtain. The same data source suggests that the share of trade between other neighbours from the Eastern
bloc, e.g. Poland and Hungary, held up much better, or actually increased, following the opening up to trade with
the rest of the world.
15Denote the rest of the UK as rUK, and the rest of Spain as rSpain.
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(a) Regression of log trade flows with Spain on log GDP (b) log trade flows with the UK on log GDP
Figure 5: Gravity equations of UK and Spain
Portugal is so economically close to Spain, and Ireland to the UK. Total trade frictions may be
determined by geography, history, culture, or simply by chance. We do not probe the reasons for
these frictions in this paper: we simply measure them, and we note that frictions appear to be
much greater between independent countries than between regions of the same country.
Despite chosing counterfactuals on the basis that they have the closest trade interaction with
Spain and the UK, these trade relationships do not look anything like the level of interaction that
Catalonia, the Basque Country and Scotland have with rSpain and rUK. Table 2a shows imports
and exports as a percentage of GDP for Portugal & Spain, Catalonia & the rSpain, Basque Country
& rSpain, Ireland & the UK, and Scotland & rUK. X ij (X
j
i ) denotes exports (imports) from (to)
i to (from) j, and in each case the smaller party is i. Therefore the first row in the table is the
bilateral trade as a percentage of the smaller entity’s GDP. The second row is bilateral trade as
a percentage of the smaller entity’s trade with the rest of the world. The third row shows λ, the
smaller entity’s home share. We see that these regions trade much much more with the rest of
the country that they are part of than Portugal or Ireland do with their closest trading partners
(though Ireland has strong trade interactions with the rest of the world, while Portugal is relatively
closed).
The trade frictions, δ, are measured by requiring the model to reproduce the trade flows seen in
the data. They are reported in Table 2b, where again i labels the small entity under consideration,
j labels the larger partner, and R labels the rest of the world.
We also calibrate the model to modified data in which we force capital flows to equal zero and
imports to equal exports (see Appendix A for details of this procedure). It can be shown (see
Appendix B for proof) that with no capital flows and with bilaterally balanced trade flows, that
δij = δ
j
i ≡ δij. The calibrated trade frictions in this case are shown in Table 2c, and can be seen to
be approximately the average of δij and δ
j
i from Table 2b.
The counterfactual policy experiment exercises use the calibrated parameter values for Cat-
alonia/rSpain, Basque/rSpain, and Scotland/rUK. These calibrations consist of the trade frictions
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Portugal/Spain Catalonia/rSpain Basque/rSpain Ireland/UK Scotland/rUK
Xij+X
j
i
GDPi
18.5% 60.7% 82.5% 32.3% 78.8%
Xij+X
j
i
XiR+X
R
i
35.8% 91.3% 149.5% 30.0% 193.4%
λi =
2Xii
GDPi+GNIi
66.7% 34.9% 33.1% 24.8% 43.8%
(a) Trade flows in data
Portugal/Spain Catalonia/rSpain Basque/rSpain Ireland/UK Scotland/rUK
δij 2.88 1.42 1.63 1.93 1.61
δji 1.90 1.41 1.48 1.70 1.54
δiR 3.28 2.68 3.09 2.03 3.03
δRi 2.71 2.25 2.96 2.02 3.04
(b) Trade frictions in model required to match data
Portugal/Spain Catalonia/rSpain Basque/rSpain Ireland/UK Scotland/rUK
δij 2.32 1.41 1.55 1.81 1.57
(c) Trade frictions in model required to match modified data
Table 2: Trade flows and trade frictions
shown in Table 2b as well as effective labour supplies, and capital transfers expressed as a per-
centage of GDP. To model independence we replace δij and δ
j
i with the δij from Table 2c (that of
Portugal for Catalonia and the Basque Country, and that of Ireland for Scotland). For Catalonia,
we also reduce the capital transfer percentage by 6.5% to account for the large fiscal transfer that
Catalonia currently pays to the rest of Spain16 no longer being payable on independence. We
leave the capital transfer percentage as calibrated for the Basque Country and for Scotland. The
current arrangements for the Basque Country are highly decentralised with taxes raised in the
Basque Country paying for spending in the Basque Country with only some payment to Madrid
for “shared services”. In the case of Scotland, we are modelling Scotland’s “on-shore” GDP and
trade, and the oil revenues that an independent Scottish Government will gain on independence
are broadly similar to the fiscal transfer that a notional “on-shore” Scotland will lose given current
government accounts17.
The results of the counterfactual policy experiement are shown in Table 3. The first three
16This is the official number for the transfer with the methodology of ”flujo beneficio” for the year 2005. In 2009
this number would be 5.8% of the GDP of Catalonia.
17Curently this “on-shore” Scotland receives a fiscal transfer from the rest of the UK - since dividing the UK in
this way means that rUK includes the “Ex-regio” region of the UK, from which North Sea oil is extracted. The
rationale for modelling Scotland in this way is that we are supposing that the imposition of a national border
between Scotland and the rest of the UK impedes cross border trade. We do this by imposing a model that has
elastic demand for a continuum of differentiated goods. This may be a good model for manufactures, and it provides
a rationale for intra-industry trade, but it is unlikely to be a good model for an essential homogenous good like oil.
Trade flows related to oil are unlikely to be impeded by independence, and so including these in the calibration and
then allowing them to be impeded in the counterfactual independence scenario would be to overstate the costs of
the border.
16
Catalonia/rSpain Basque/rSpain Scotland/rUK
Xij+X
j
i
GDPi
13.9% 25.8% 53.7%
Xij+X
j
i
XiR+X
R
i
16.6% 36.2% 118.0%
λi =
2Xii
GDPi+GNIi
51.4% 52.9% 53.4%
∆ real GDP i -9.5% -12.5% -5.5%
∆ real GDP j -1.9% -0.6% -0.4%
∆ real GNI i -3.4% -12.5% -5.5%
∆ real GNI j -3.1% -0.6% -0.4%
Φii -12.7% -16.6% -7.3%
Φij +76.6% +54.9% +16.9%
ΦiR -7.7% -4.5% -3.3%
Table 3: Results of counterfactual independence scenarios
rows can be compared with the data in Table 2a. The next four rows show the impact upon
production (GDP) and income (GNI) on both the now independent region, and on its former
union partner. The final three rows show how the productivity thresholds for firm existence,
selection into exporting to former union partner, and selection into exporting internationally, have
changed.
The increase in distance with their largest trading partners has dramatic effects on trade, pro-
duction and welfare. There is a large fall in productive capacity in these small economies, and
a smaller loss in the larger economies of their former union partners. The degree of interaction
between these former partners comes to resemble the degree of interaction between normal coun-
tries i.e. it is similar to the Portugal/Spain and Ireland/UK interactions seen in Table 2a. The
explanation for these changes can be seen in the bottom three rows of the table: the productiv-
ity threshold for the existence of a firm has fallen, because wages have fallen, and so more low
quality firms exist, reducing employment in high quality firms i.e. there has been a reallocation
of resources away from quality which pushes TFP down. The productivity threshold for selecting
into exports with former union partner has risen dramatically as the costs of doing this business
have risen with δ. The productivity threshold for selecting into exports to the rest of the world
has fallen slightly: the costs of doing this business are unchanged but local wages have fallen and
so slightly lower quality firms than previously find it profitable to export.
The effect of eliminating the fiscal transfer from Catalonia to the rest of Spain is seen in the
divergence of impact between GDP and GNI: the productivity impact of increased trade frictions
for Catalonia is broadly similar to that for the Basque Country and for Scotland; but the welfare
impact is muted by the gains from not paying the fiscal transfer. Obviously money that is not
transfered to the rest of Spain increases income in Catalonia. What changes here is the distribution
of the losses, which now fall more heavily on the rest of Spain. This distribution of losses does not
greatly affect the impacts on the firm quality distribution. The loss in Catalonia is mitigated by
not paying the fiscal transfer, whilst the loss in the rest of Spain is now larger.
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Catalonia/rSpain Basque/rSpain Scotland/rUK
(Xij+X
j
i )
′
Xij+X
j
i
20.8% 27.3% 64.4%
Table 4: Trade flows with partner in counterfactual as a percentage of those flows in data
Comparison with existing literature
Our estimated impact upon regional trade is perfectly consistent with the literature on border
effects taking into account endogeneity and trade with the rest of the world. Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) (AvW) estimate that we should expect to see a fall in trade of around 80% when
comparing trade across a border to trade without the border. Our results, shown in Table 4, are
entirely consistent with AvW for Catalonia and the Basque Country, and so they do not appear to
be exceptional when viewed under the light of the border effect. The results for Scotland do not
show such an extreme reduction in Scotland-rUK trade, which falls by only 35.6%. This is because
Ireland is calibrated as having a relatively “thin” (but still of country-country level) border with
the UK. The reason why these regions trade “so much” and why they concentrates their trade so
much is due to the “thick” border with the rest of the world and the “thin” border with the rest
of the country of which they are currently a part.
The gains from trade in the literature are usually expressed as a welfare cost on moving to an
autarkic state i.e λ′ → 100%. Using the ACR formula, we can simply calculate the welfare loss on
moving from trade flows seen in the data, to a state of autarky. These results are shown in Table
5. The point of this exercise is to show the relative value of low region-region borders with a single
party compared with country-country borders with every other country in the world. Therefore
it is easier to simply use the ACR formula for Catalonia, since distortions caused by the change
of capital flow will appear in every result and will to first order cancel out. The first row repeats
data from Table 2a, the second row uses this in the ACR formula with λ′ = 100%. The third row
calculates the cost of independence using the ACR formula on λ′ from Table 3, and the forth row
shows the required residual losses to go from independence to autarky. The final row shows that
the losses on independence represent a significant percentage of the total losses that these regions
stand to lose on complete autarky.
Portugal Catalonia Basque Ireland Scotland
λi 66.7% 34.9% 33.1% 24.8% 43.8%
∆real GNI: Autarky -10.9% -25.8% -26.9% -32.7% -20.9%
∆real GNI: Independence -10.4% -12.5% -5.5%
∆real GNI: Autarky once independent -10.9% -17.2% -16.5% -32.7% -16.3%
Independence / Autarky 40.2% 46.3% 26.2%
Table 5: Losses on independence relative to losses on autarky
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(a) Regions are better than expected at trading with their largest
partner
(b) Regions do not seem to be any worse than expected at trade
with the rest of the world
Figure 6: Distances with main trading partner and rest of the world
Regional intergration with the rest of the world
The cost of autarky for the regions is high, but this is because it is the composition of two
losses. The first loss is the increase in frictions with their union partner, that were very low (much
lower than the normal between countries), and are then those of a normal country. The second
loss is the increase in frictions from having normal country borders with their union partner and
with the rest of the world, to having infinite frictions. This composite effect means that we may
expect the cost of autarky for sub-national regions to be higher than is estimated for independent
countries of equivalent size. However, this is conditional on regions within larger nations being as
economically integrated with the rest of the world as independent nations. Given the data we have
collected in this exercise, we can provide some evidence as to whether this is true or not. Figure
6a shows the OECD countries alongside Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque Country, in terms of
their measured trade frictions with their largest trading partner. As can be seen, and consistent
with the above results, our regions have substantially lower frictions with their largest partners
than the countries.
Figure 6b then shows the corresponding friction with the rest of the world, after stripping out
the largest trading partner. Now we can see that the regions have roughly the expected level of
trading frictions with respect to the rest of the world. There is no evidence, from this exercise,
that newly independent regions can expect to substitute higher frictions with their former union
partners for lower frictions with the rest of the world.
Alternative counterfactual scenarios
The gains from trade to a region from the economic integration it enjoys with its union partner
is a significant proportion of its total gains from trade. These gains from trade are clearly a function
of what we believe the border frictions will be on independence. We can show this graphically
by generating a series of welfare results for Scotland, changing only frictions with the rest of the
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Figure 7: Scottish GNI as a function of the trade friction with the rest of the UK.
UK between each result and graphing on a single plot, see Figure 718. Perhaps it was felt that, as
trade in goods between Ireland and the UK is largely across a sea, a lower increase in frictions was
appropriate for Scotland? Conversely, it could be argued that Ireland’s exceptionally high level
of openness means that a higher increase in frictions is appropriate for an independent Scotland?
The results of these alternative counterfactual scenarios can be read off from Figure 7. It could be
argued that Scotland trade with the rest of the world will change in one way or the other - this
would correspond to a vertical shift in the curve in Figure 7, the precise quantification of which
would be generated by explicitly changing the friction with the rest of the world in the model.
In general, the relationship between independent countries is such that their trade exists along
the ‘flat part’ of the ‘frictions vs income’ curve, whereas sub-national regions exist in the steeper
region where gains from trade are larger. This suggests that there may exist large economic
benefits, through closer trade links, of further integration at the EU level (since, as per Figure 3b,
we observe that the borders between EU member states are of the “thick”, independent country
type).
6. Trade Costs in the EU
The single market in the EU is an attempt to create the trade benefits of a single country
across Europe. Are national borders within the EU ”thinner” than borders across the EU/non-EU
divide? Table 6 shows the model measured frictions between some potential candidates for EU
membership19 and the EU, and the frictions between some selected EU members (selected on the
basis of matching the non-EU members to some extent) and the rest of the EU.
18Note that the limit of infinite frictions on this plot does not correspond to the autarkic Scotland - the only
friction that is being changed in this plot is the friction with the rest of the UK, the friction with the rest of the
world is unaltered.
19This is a limited set given our OECD dataset.
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Non EU δEU Adj δEU Matched EU δrEU Adj δrEU
Norway 2.27 2.90 Sweden 2.12 2.74
Iceland 3.64 3.81 Finland 2.41 2.99
Denmark 2.22 2.80
Switzerland 1.95 2.53 Austria 1.96 2.51
Turkey 2.78 3.69 Greece 2.90 3.64
Table 6: Frictions across and within EU borders
These results are suggestive of a small border effect from the EU, though not on the same
scale as the internal border effect described in the previous section. Obviously there are many
potential endogeneity issues here e.g. perhaps Switzerland did not join the EU since there were
some costs in other spheres, and it already had all the trade benefits that it could get from the EU
countries, whilst countries that could gain trade benefits on joining did so and have now reduced
their frictions to something akin to Switzerland’s. Conversely there could be dynamic issues and
a process may be underway which has reduced the frictions within the EU and may reduce them
further.
The correlation between membership or otherwise of the EU and the log of adjusted trade
frictions is such that membership of the EU is associated with perhaps a 3% reduction in size
adjusted trade frictions. Clearly, we cannot claim that this is causative. However it can form
the basis for starting to consider the trade implications of a British exit from the EU, so-called
“Brexit”, a referendum on which is proposed by the Conservative Party for 2017. Further, because
the UK makes a net contribution to EU finances, these trade costs can be compared with the
benefits of not paying the UK’s net contribution in the same manner as we compared the trade
costs to Catalonia with the benefits they receive from not paying the fiscal transfer. The UK’s
net contribution20 is estimated at 0.2% of UK GDP, and our counterfactual Brexit scenario is to
increase frictions by 3%. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 7.
UK in EU UK out EU
δrEU 1.97 2.03
λUK 70% 71%
∆real GDP -0.5%
∆real GNI -0.3%
Table 7: The trade cost of Brexit
It is interesting that the net contribution required of the UK is of the same order as the trade
benefits that the UK gains from EU membership under this estimate of the magnitude that trade
frictions are reduced by EU membership. Clearly however, whatever the magnitude of the trade
gains from EU membership, they do not reduce trade frictions to the level of internal borders
within a country.
20Reported on the BBC as e3.5b, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8036097.stm
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7. The United States of Europe
Suppose, a United States of Europe could be achieved. What are the potential gains? We can
estimate these by reducing all measured frictions within the EU by the average considered in our
counterfactual exercises of Section 5 in the following manner21:
δ′ij = δ
exp (−58%)
ij
The Scottish friction represents a reduction of 27% compared to the Irish friction, whilst the
Catalan friction represents a reduction of 89% compared to the Portuguese friction. Therefore we
quantify the impact of achieving a United States of Europe by considering an across the board
reduction in frictions of 58%, which is the average of these two figures. Performing this policy
experiment (see Appendix C for the numerical procedure) produces a gain in GNI of approximately
17%. Analysing the resulting distribution of trade frictions in the manner of Section 4 suggests
that this calculation is fair: Figure 8 shows that the mean (size adjusted) bilateral trade friction
for the United States of Europe is approximately equal to the average Canadian provincial, or US
State bilateral trade frictions22.
Figure 8: As Figure 3b, now also showing estimated United States of Europe
8. Conclusion
We have shown evidence that the independence seeking regions of Europe are typical open
economies if we include trade with the rest of the country of which they are currently part.
However, these regions have an exceptionally high level of economic integration with their union
21This method ensures that large frictions see proportionately larger reductions, and as the friction, δ → 1, no
reduction is seen
22Error bars are constructed using the Irish to Scottish reduction of 27% for the upper bound, and the Portuguese
to Catalan reduction of 89% for the lower bound.
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partners. The level of this integration is such their trade patterns are atypical of independent
countries. To maintain these levels of trade concentration after a move to independence would
make these countries highly anomalous. We implement a model of these regions as independent
countries which are relatively close to their former union partners, but not exceptionally close
compared with other independent countries. Natural counterfactual example exist, which are
economically close to these countries, but not exceptionally close like these regions.
We provide evidence for this being a reasonable exercise by using our structural model, based
on Melitz (2003), to measure trade frictions across groups of countries and regions. We show that
country-country borders are systematically substantially and significantly more frictional than
region-region borders. Further, we demonstrate that this exercise is on the conservative side by
presenting evidence that a large degree of home bias in services trade enhances the border effect.
Given that country-country and region-region borders appear to be systematically different, we
propose that we calibrate the model to a region of interest, the rest of the country of which it is part,
and the rest of the world; and also to a plausible counterfactual small country, our large country
of interest, and the rest of the world. These calibrations produce a set of parameters which, when
plugged into the model, reproduce the incomes and trade flows seen in the data. In the calibrations,
the counterfactual countries have much more frictional trade with the whole unions, than the
independence seeking regions have with their union partners. The policy experiment undertaken is
simply to replace the region’s friction with its union partner with the small independent country’s
friction with the whole union, keeping all other parameters unchanged. Observing the impacts
upon incomes and trade flows, we see that the economic integration of these regions with their
union partners represents a significant fraction of their overall gains from trade.
On the other hand, the borders of the EU do not seem especially frictional compared with
normal country-country borders. There is a weak correlation between EU membership and lower
frictions in trading with the EU, but it is very weak. Using this observed correlation we estimate
that the trade benefits that the UK receives from the EU are likely of the same order as its net
contribution to the EU, but could very easily be larger. If however, the EU could evolve such that
it comes to resemble a United States of Europe then the welfare gains could be large, we estimate
a level effect of perhaps 17% of income.
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Appendices
A. Data
The data is all from years 2005 - 2007 (recent but not so recent as to be subject to further revision
and unaffected by disruptions due to financial crisis from 2008 onwards).
Country Data
Have GDP and total (goods and services) bilateral trade flows for 2006 from the OECD(
S˜iW˜i
)
& Xij ,∀i & ∀j 6= i
Goods trade from the OECD’s “STAN Bilateral Trade Database by Industry and End-use category”
Services trade from the OECD’s “EBOPS 2002 - Trade in Services by Partner Country”
Consistent GDP measures infered from
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/exports-of-goods-and-services_exp-gds-serv-table-en
and
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/imports-of-goods-and-services_imp-gds-serv-table-en
“Rest of the world GDP” infered from the OECD’s “Economic Outlook No 93 - June 2013 - Long-
term baseline projections”
US Data
2007 State GDP as percentage of US GDP, from Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.
gov/itable/
2007 bilateral trade flows (goods only) between states and internationally from the Freight Analysis
Framework http://faf.ornl.gov/fafweb/Extraction0.aspx
State GDP for use in the model is taken to be the US GDP from the Country data above multiplied
by the state percentage of total GDP from this dataset
State exports to other states and internationally, for use in this model, is taken to be US interna-
tional exports from the country data above multiplied by the individual trade flow from this dataset
divided by total US international exports from this dataset.
Canadian Data
2006 Data from Statistics Canada, Table 386-0002 Interprovincial and international trade flows at
producer prices
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a05?lang=eng&id=3860002
This gives bilateral trade flows (either goods only, or goods and services) between provinces and
internationally, as well as provincial GDPs
Provincial GDP for use in the model is taken to be the Canadian GDP from the Country data
above multiplied by the provincial share of total GDP from this dataset
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Provincial exports to other provinces and internationally, for use in this model, is taken to be
Canadian international exports from the country data above multiplied by the individual trade
flow from this dataset divided by total Canadian international exports from this dataset.
Spanish Data
Goods only trade data, as at 2006, for all Spanish Autonomous Communities in terms of imports
and exports to the rest of Spain and internationally, from C-Intereg 2008 (Table 6 on p28 of http://
www.c-intereg.es/El_Comercio_Interregional_en_Espa%C3%B1a_1995-2006_29_10_08.pdf)
A matrix of goods only bilateral trade flows between Autonomous Communities from C-Intereg
statistics query: ”Filas: CCAA origen: Todos; Columnas: Unidades; CCAA destino: Todos; Flujo:
Inter + Intra; Dato acumulado de los an˜os: 2005” on http://212.227.102.53/explotacion_
multidimensional_comercio_interregional/estadisticas.aspx
Autonomous Community GDPs from Eurostat (”Regional gross domestic product by NUTS 2
regions - million EUR, Code: tgs00003”
Separately, we have goods & services data for Catalonia and the Basque Country.
Autonomous Community Goods only data
Autonomous Community GDP for use in the model is taken to be the Spanish GDP from the
Country Data above multiplied by the Autonomous Community share of total GDP in 2006 from
Eurostat data
The 2006 trade data is used to split Spanish trade with the rest of the world by A.C. and the trade
with the rest of Spain is inferred from the comparison between rSpain and RoW trade by A.C. from
this table
The trade with the rest of Spain is split into balateral trade across all A.C.s using matrix of bilateral
trade flows
Catalonia
Use Eurostat GDP split, now as at 2005, to calculate Catalan and rSpain GDP from Spanish GDP
from Country Data
Goods and services trade with rest of Spain and with rest of the world from Comptes econo`mics
simplificats de l’economia catalana 2005, expressed as % of Catalan GDP allows us to calculate
Catalan trade with rSpain and RoW from Catalan GDP
rSpain trade with rest of the world taken to be Spanish trade from Country Data minus Catalan
trade from above
Split Catalan trade with rest of the world, as calculated above, using data from C-Intereg (Table 4
of http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/economia/Documents/Arxius/doc_14603187_1.pdf) for use
in Herfindahl calc
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Basque Country
Use Eurostat GDP split, now as at 2005, to calculate Basque and rSpain GDP from Spanish GDP
from Country Data
Goods and services trade with rest of Spain and with rest of the world from http://en.eustat.es/
elementos/ele0010000/ti_Gross_Domestic_Product_of_the_Basque_Country_by_components_
Supply_and_demand_Current_prices_thousands_of_euros_2005-2012a/tbl0010072_i.html#axzz2vHsbZzjnexpressed
as % of Basque GDP allows us to calculate Basque trade with rSpain and RoW from Basque GDP
rSpain trade with rest of the world taken to be Spanish trade from Country Data minus Basque
trade from above
Split Basque trade with rest of the world, as calculated above, by destination for imports and
exports from Eustat (http://en.eustat.es/ci_ci/estadisticas/tema_374/opt_0/tipo_1/ti_
Foreign_Trade/temas.html#axzz2vHsbZzjn) for use in Herfindahl calc
Scottish Data
Use GERS (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/03/1859) ratio of ”Scotland - Ex-
cluding North Sea GDP” to UK GDP, for 2006-07, to split the UK GDP from Country Data
Goods and services trade with rest of UK and with rest of the world from Scottish Government’s
Input-Output tables for 2007 (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/
Input-Output/Downloads/IO1998-2009All), expressed as % of Scottish GDP allows us to calcu-
late Scottish trade with rUK and RoW from Scottish GDP
rUK trade with rest of the world taken to be UK trade from Country Data minus Scottish trade
from above
Split Scottish trade with rest of the world, as calculated above, by destination from Global Con-
nections Survey 2011 data for 2007 (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/
Economy/Exports/GCSIntroduction/GCS2011pdf) for use in Herfindahl calc
3 Country Model Data Procedure
Suppose
Xii =
(
S˜iW˜i
)
−
∑
j 6=i
Xij
Yi =
n∑
j=1
Xji
Ti = Yi −
(
S˜iW˜i
)
Di =
(
S˜iW˜i
)
Yi
Xii
(derived from gravity equation - See Appendix B)
n Country Model Data Procedure
Use an alternative procedure that eliminates capital flows, equates GDP and GNI and equates imports
and exports:
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As before, calculate from data
Xii =
(
S˜iW˜i
)
−
∑
j 6=i
Xij
Now however let
Xii = X
i
i
Xij =
1
2
(
Xij +X
j
i
)
= Xji
Yi =
(
S˜iW˜i
)′
=
n∑
j=1
Xij
so Ti = 0
& Di =
Y 2i
Xii
B. Proofs
Result 1: Model defined by system of equations
We can evaluate the distribution function for productivity and hence the probability of a firm receiving
a productivity draw that will lead it to choose to produce:
Pr(φ ≥ Φii) = 1− F (Φii) =
(
b
Φii
)k
= bk
(
Θ
c
)−µ
θ
(
Wi
Pi
)−µ
; where µ = k
θ
θ − 1
We assume k > θ − 1 so that average profits, revenues and labour demand are defined23.
The average realised per period net profit, labour demand24, and value of sales, of the observed firms
is the expected value of these quantities, conditional on existence:
p¯ii =
∫ ∞
b
N∑
j=1
piij(φ)
dF (φ)
1− F (Φii)
= cWi
[
1
θ
− 1
µ
]−1 1
µ
Di
Pi
L¯i =
∫ ∞
b
N∑
j=1
Lij(φ)
dF (φ)
1− F (Φii)
= c
[
1
θ
− 1
µ
]−1(
1− 1
µ
)
Di
Pi
r¯i =
∫ ∞
b
N∑
j=1
rij(φ)
dF (φ)
1− F (Φii)
= cWi
[
1
θ
− 1
µ
]−1 Di
Pi
Where we define effective (nominal) demand in economy i as:
Di =
N∑
j=1
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)1−µ
Yj
The world economy is in steady state general equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
(i) Within each country there are perfect financial markets which allow prospective firms to borrow
to finance firm creation via contingent contracts which, in equilibrium, will be repaid using any realised
23Profits, revenues and labour demand also have a Pareto distribution, but with exponent k + 2− θ. The means
of these Pareto distributions are only defined if k + 2− θ > 1 i.e. k > θ − 1.
24Notice that labour demand from the average firm does not depend on the wage. The total labour demand it is
going to depend on wages though because the number of firms will depend on wage.
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profits. Free entry for entrepreneurs to create firms therefore means that the expected value of firm
creation will be driven to zero:
E[V i] = F (Φii)× 0 + (1− F (Φii))×
p¯ii
1− β −Wic˜ = 0
i.e.
(
Wi
Pi
)−µ Di
Pi
=
c˜ (1− β)
cbk
( c
Θ
)µ
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
µ
(ii) Labour supply equals labor demand in all countries. Let the number of firms producing in economy
i be Mi, then we know that in each period (1−β)Mi firms die. In steady state, Mi is constant and so the
number of entrepreneurs who hire labour in an attempt to create a firm must be such that the resulting
number of firms that choose to operate (i.e. who have φ > Φii) is equal to (1 − β)Mi i.e. the labour
employed in paying the fixed creation cost:
Lcreation =
1− β
1− F (Φhi )
Mic˜ = cMi
(
Di
Pi
)(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)−1 1
µ
Total demand for effective labour is the sum of Lcreation and the labour employed by the firms that
have decided to go ahead (MiL¯
i). Effective labour supply, Si is an exogenous parameter, different in
different economies, that we will calibrate to. Equilibrium means that effective labour supply equals
demand for effective labour: (1
θ
− 1
µ
)
Si = cMi
Di
Pi
(iii) All income must be spent and there must be a balance of payments in all economies. Since
perfect financial markets drive the expected value of firm creation to zero, the nominal value of goods
production in economy i must equal payments to labour in economy i, SiWi. Consumers in economy
i spend some amount Yi on goods, and the difference between labour income and goods expenditure in
economy i, Ti = SiWi − Yi, is some (exogenous) capital account or factor payment made by economy i
into world capital markets. Balance of payments across the world implies that
∑N
i=1 Ti = 0. The nominal
value of exports from economy i to economy j is:
Xij = Mi
1− F (Φij)
1− F (Φii)
∫
Φij
rij(φ)
dF (φ)
1− F (Φij)
= cMi
Wi
Pi
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)1−µ
Yj
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)−1
A balance of payments in economy i implies that its imports (including imports from itself, Xii ) are
equal to its total expediture, whilst its exports (including its exports to itself, Xii ) are equal to its total
labour income i.e.
N∑
j=1
Xij = SiWi = Yi − Ti
N∑
j=1
Xji = Yi =
N∑
j=1
cMj
Wj
Pj
(
Pj
Pi
δji
)1−µ
Yi
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)−1
Result 2: Gravity equation of the model
The equation for Xij in the proof of Result 1 above can be manipulated by substituting in from
equation (3) to get:
lnXij = ln (SiWi) + lnYj − lnDi + (1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)
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All parameters other than µ and θ can be eliminated
The equations of the model are:
Di =
N∑
j=1
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)1−µ
Yj(
Wi
Pi
)−µ Di
Pi
=
c˜ (1− β)
cbk
( c
Θ
)µ
θ
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
µ(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
Si = cMi
Di
Pi
N∑
j=1
Xij = SiWi = Yi − Ti
N∑
j=1
Xji = Yi =
N∑
j=1
cMj
Wj
Pj
(
Pj
Pi
δji
)1−µ
Yi
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)−1
lnXij = ln (SiWi) + lnYj − lnDi + (1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)
But the effective labour supplies, Si, the wage per unit effective labour, Wi, and the measures of the
continuum of firms, Mi, are in notional, model consistent units. We never equate these model consistent
quantities with anything observable in real world data. Therefore we can define:
W˜i =
[
c˜ (1− β)
cbk
( c
Θ
)µ
θ
] 1
µ
Wi
S˜i =
[
c˜ (1− β)
cbk
( c
Θ
)µ
θ
]− 1
µ
Si
M˜i =
[
c˜ (1− β)
cbk
( c
Θ
)µ
θ
]− 1
µ
cMi
Making these substitutions produces the following equations for the model, which as required, have only
the parameters µ and θ:
Di =
N∑
j=1
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)1−µ
Yj(
W˜i
Pi
)−µ
Di
Pi
=
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
µ(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
S˜i = M˜i
Di
Pi
N∑
j=1
Xij = S˜iW˜i = Yi − Ti
N∑
j=1
Xji = Yi =
N∑
j=1
M˜j
W˜j
Pj
(
Pj
Pi
δji
)1−µ
Yi
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)−1
lnXij = ln (S˜iW˜i) + lnYj − lnDi + (1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)
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Di is data
The gravity equation of the model is:
lnXij = ln (S˜iW˜i) + lnYj − lnDi + (1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)
Given a model consistent dataset, this equation holds for all bilateral trade flows. In particular it holds
for Xii . Therefore, and using the fact that δ
i
i = 1, we have:
lnXii = ln (S˜iW˜i) + lnYi − lnDi + (1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pi
δii
)
= ln (S˜iW˜i) + lnYi − lnDi + (1− µ) ln 1
= ln (S˜iW˜i) + lnYi − lnDi
i.e. Di =
(S˜iW˜i)Yi
Xii
Since GDP, (S˜iW˜i), GNI, Yi =
∑n
j=1X
j
i , and internal trade, X
i
i =
(
S˜iW˜i
)
−∑j 6=iXij , are all data, so
too is Di.
Defining δj
Use normalisation, P1 = 1 and the gravity equation to define δj as
δj ≡ δ1j =
(
X1jD1
(S˜1W˜1)Yj
) 1
1−µ (Pj
P1
)
=
(
X1jD1
(S˜1W˜1)Yj
) 1
1−µ
Pj
Then we have:
δij =
(
XijDi
(S˜iW˜i)Yj
) 1
1−µ (Pj
Pi
)
=
(
X1jD1
(S˜1W˜1)Yj
) 1
1−µ
Pj(
X1i D1
(S˜1W˜1)Yi
) 1
1−µ
Pi
(
X1iX
i
j
X1j
Di
(S˜iW˜i)Yj
) 1
1−µ
=
δj
δi
(
X1iX
i
j
X1jX
i
i
) 1
1−µ
Therefore, since in calibration mode Xij is data, we can express the N(N − 1) parameters, δij , in terms of
the N unknowns, δj .
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The Standard deviation of log firm sales in this model is given by (θ−1)/k
Firm sales of a firm in i selling into j
rij (φ) = θΘ
(
φ
δij
)θ−1(
Wi
Pj
)1−θ
Yj
where
φ ∼ Pareto (b, k)
Therefore the total sales of any firm can be written as
r (φ) = κφθ−1 = κbθ−1
(
φ
b
)θ−1
= κbθ−1Z
for constant κ.
i.e.
ln r = lnκbθ−1 + lnZ
so
StD [ln r] = StD [lnZ]
Pr (lnZ < z) = Pr
(
ln
(
φ
b
)θ−1
< z
)
= Pr
(
φ < b exp
(
z
θ − 1
))
= F
(
b exp
(
z
θ − 1
))
= 1−
 b
b exp
(
z
θ−1
)
k
i.e. G (z) = 1− exp
(
− k
θ − 1z
)
i.e. lnZ ∼ Exp
(
k
θ−1
)
Therefore
StD [ln r] = StD [lnZ] =
θ − 1
k
Symmetric trade frictions in model with no capital flows implies bilat-
erally balanced trade
This is the statement that:
(S˜iW˜i) = Yi and δ
i
j = δ
j
i ⇒ Xij = Xji
The previous equations for δ1j = δ
j
1 give us
δj1 =
δ1
δj
(
X1jX
j
1
X11X
j
j
) 1
1−µ
=
δj
δ1
(
X11X
1
j
X1jX
1
1
) 1
1−µ
= δ1j
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But δ1j = δj and δ1 = 1. Therefore
δj =
(
X1jX
j
1
X11X
j
j
) 1
2(1−µ)
so δij =
(
(Xij)
2 X
j
1X
1
i
X1jX
i
1X
i
iX
j
j
) 1
2(1−µ)
Then δij = δ
j
i implies
Xj1X
1
i
X1jX
i
1
=
Xji
Xij
Substituting this into the above expression for δij allows us to eliminate the tradeflows with country 1 i.e.
δij =
(
XijX
j
i
XiiX
j
j
) 1
2(1−µ)
= δji
NB This is analogous and very similar to the equivalent formula derived in Caselli, Koren, Lisicky, and
Tenreyro (2012).
The gravity equation with no capital flows is:
lnXij = lnYi + lnYj − lnDi + (1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)
lnXji = lnYi + lnYj − lnDj + (1− µ) ln
(
Pj
Pi
δij
)
so lnXij − lnXji = lnDj − lnDi + 2(1− µ) ln
(
Pi
Pj
)
i.e. trade is bilaterally balanced if
Di
Dj
=
(
Pi
Pj
)2(1−µ)
=
 1
δij
(
XijDi
YiYj
) 1
1−µ
2(1−µ)
=
(
XiiX
j
j
XijX
j
i
)(
XijDi
YiYj
)2
Using the relation that Di = Y
2
i /X
i
i in a model with no capital flows, this expression reduces to
1 =
Xij
Xji
i.e. bilaterally balanced trade.
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Independence from aggregation level of the rest of the world
It is immediately clear that, in the simple world of bilaterally balanced trade and no capital flows,
the measured frictions between economy a and economy b do not depend upon how C, the set of other
economies in the world, is aggregated. This is obvious from the formula, derived in Appendix C, which
shows that C does not enter:
δab =
(
Xab(DaDb)
1/2
YaYb
) 1
1−µ
=
(
Xab
(XaaXbb)1/2
) 1
1−µ
For the full model, with capital flows and without necessarily bilaterally balanced trade, things are
more complicated. To simplify, note that the labelling of countries is arbitrary, and without loss of
generality we can label country a as 1, and country b as 2. This has the advantage that we normalise
with respect to country 1 and so P1 = 1. We want to show that δ
1
2 and δ
2
1 are independent of how the set
of countries C = {3, ..., n}, are aggregated.
Firstly, from the gravity equation, it is clear that the quantity PiPj δ
i
j =
(
XijDi
(S˜iW˜i)Yj
)1/(1−µ)
is inde-
pendent of the aggregation of countries h 6= i, j
Then
D1 =
n∑
j=1
(
P1
Pj
δ1j
)1−µ
Yj
= Y1 +
(
P1
P2
δ12
)1−µ
Y2 +
∑
j∈C
(
P1
Pj
δ1j
)1−µ
Yj
= Y1 +
(
1
P2
δ12
)1−µ
Y2 +
D1
(S˜1W˜1)
∑
j∈C
X1j
= Y1 +
(
1
P2
δ12
)1−µ
Y2 +ADATA
where clearly ADATA does not depend on the aggregation within the set C
Likewise
D2 =
n∑
j=1
(
P2
Pj
δ2j
)1−µ
Yj
=
(
P2
P1
δ21
)1−µ
Y1 + Y2 +
∑
j∈C
(
P2
Pj
δ2j
)1−µ
Yj
=
(
P2δ
2
1
)1−µ
Y1 + Y2 +
D2
(S˜2W˜2)
∑
j∈C
X2j
=
(
P2δ
2
1
)1−µ
Y1 + Y2 +BDATA
where clearly BDATA does not depend on the aggregation within the set C
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Combine two gravity equatiions to get a third condition
lnX21 = ln
(
S˜2W˜2
)
+ lnY1 − lnD2 + (1− µ) ln
(
P2
P1
δ21
)
lnX12 = ln
(
S˜1W˜1
)
+ lnY2 − lnD1 + (1− µ) ln
(
P1
P2
δ12
)
δ12δ
2
1 =
 D1D2X21X12(
S˜1W˜1
)(
S˜2W˜2
)
Y1Y2
 11−µ
i.e. we have 3 equations in 3 unknowns, {δ12 , δ21 , P2}, which can be solved without any consideration
of how the set C is aggregated
D1 = Y1 +
(
1
P2
δ12
)1−µ
Y2 +ADATA
D2 =
(
P2δ
2
1
)1−µ
Y1 + Y2 +BDATA
δ12δ
2
1 =
 D1D2X21X12(
S˜1W˜1
)(
S˜2W˜2
)
Y1Y2
 11−µ
Negative relationship between size and measured frictions
Suppose that the world consists of Ω identical small countries, each with GDP = GNI = Y , so that
world GDP, YW = ΩY . Since all countries are identical, price level P and home share λ = (Y − (Ω −
1)X)/Y , must be identical in each country. There is a constant bilateral trade friction, δ between any
two countries which perfectly determines bilateral trade flows i.e.
lnX = 2 lnY − lnD + (1− µ) ln δ
= 2 lnY − ln
(
Y
λ
)
+ (1− µ) ln δ
= ln (λY ) + (1− µ) ln δ
i.e. X = λY δ1−µ
Now consider the case where we cannot observe these small identical countries, but instead the observed
actual countries are aggregrationsM = {1, ...,m} andN = {m+1, ...,m+n} of non-overlapping underlying
“countries”. In this case:
YM = mY
YN = nY
XMM = mλY +m(m− 1)X
XNN = nλY + n(n− 1)X
XMN = mnX = XNM
If we now use the model to measure the frictions associated with observed trade flows, using the procedure
for calibrating the simplified model with bilaterally balanced trade and no capital flows from Appendix
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C, we obtain
δMN =
(
XMN
X
1/2
MMX
1/2
NN
) 1
1−µ
ln δMN =
1
1− µ ln
(
mnλY δ1−µ
(mλY +m(m− 1)λY δ1−µ)1/2(nλY + n(n− 1)λY δ1−µ)1/2
)
=
1
1− µ ln
(
m1/2n1/2δ1−µ
(1 + (m− 1)δ1−µ)1/2(1 + (n− 1)δ1−µ)1/2
)
Differentiating ln δMN by lnYM and evaluating this at m = 1 gives
∂ ln δMN
∂ lnYM
=
∂ ln δMN
∂ lnm
=
1
2(1− µ)
(
1− δ
1−µm
1 + (m− 1)δ1−µ
)
i.e.
∂ ln δMN
∂ lnYM
(m = 1) =
1− δ1−µ
2(1− µ)
Therefore, purely from aggregation effects rather than any real frictions, we would expect to observe a
negative relationship between log frictions and log incomes with a slope in the range 12(1−µ) < 0 (for high
values of δ) to 0 (for a value of δ ≈ 1). This range, given the value of µ used in the main analysis, is
(−0.1419, 0). The empirically observed slopes shown in Figure 2 are −0.0700 for country-country frictions,
and −0.0967 for region-region frictions.
C. Numerical procedures
Calibrating simplified model with bilaterally balanced trade and no
capital flows
From data we have {Yi, Xij , Di}, ∀i, j. We know that balanced trade and no capital flows is associated
with symmetric trade frictions. Therefore, the gravity equation implies
δij =
(
XijDi
YiYj
) 1
1−µ Pj
Pi
=
(
XijDj
YiYj
) 1
1−µ Pi
Pj
= δji
therefore
Pi
Pj
=
(
Di
Dj
) 1
2(1−µ)
so δij =
(
Xij(DiDj)
1/2
YiYj
) 1
1−µ
=
(
Xij
(XiiXjj)1/2
) 1
1−µ
So we have the price indices and bilateral trade frictions directly from data. We can solve for the wage
rate per unit effective labour, the quantity of effective labour and the measure of the continuum of firms
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using: (
W˜i
Pi
)−µ
Di
Pi
=
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
µ
Yi = S˜iW˜i(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
S˜i = M˜i
Di
Pi
Calibrating full model to data that divides the world into 3 countries
From data we have {(S˜iW˜i, Yi, Xij , Ti, Di}, ∀i, j. We then find the endogenous variables of the model
{S˜i, W˜i, Pi, M˜i, δi}, by solving the following system of 15 equations simultaneously, using the results of
the calibration under bilaterally balanced trade and no capital flows as an initial condition, using Excel’s
solver tool.
S˜i =
(
S˜iW˜i
)
W˜i
, i = {1, 2, 3}
M˜i =
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
Pi
Di
S˜i , i = {1, 2, 3}
δi
Pi
=
(
X1iD1
(S˜1W˜1)Yi
) 1
1−µ
, i = {1, 2, 3}(
W˜i
Pi
)−µ
Di
Pi
=
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
µ , i = {1, 2, 3}
1 =
∑
j
(
S˜jW˜j
)
Dj
(
X1jX
j
i
X1iX
j
j
)(
Pj
Pi
δi
δj
)1−µ
, i = {2, 3}
P1 = 1
3 country model policy experiments
By assumption we have {S˜i, δij , Ti}, ∀i, j. We then find the endogenous variables of the model
{W˜i, M˜i, Pi, Yi, Di}, by solving the following system of 15 equations simultaneously, using the results
of the calibration before changing the parameters as an initial condition, using Excel’s solver tool.(
W˜i
Pi
)−µ
Di
Pi
=
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
µ , i = {1, 2, 3}
M˜i =
(
1
θ
− 1
µ
)
Pi
Di
S˜i , i = {1, 2, 3}
Di =
∑
j
(
Pi
Pj
δij
)1−µ
Yj , i = {1, 2, 3}
Yi = S˜iW˜i + Ti , i = {1, 2, 3}
1 =
∑
j
S˜jW˜j
Dj
(
Pj
Pi
δji
)1−µ
, i = {2, 3}
P1 = 1
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n country model policy experiments (assuming bilaterally balanced trade
and no capital flows)
By assumption we have {S˜i, δij , Ti = 0}, ∀i, j. We then find the endogenous variables of the model
{Xii, Di}, by solving the following system of 2n equations simultaneously, using the results of the cali-
bration before changing the parameters as an initial condition, using Excel’s solver tool.
(µ
θ
− 1
)− 1
µ
=
(
D
− 1
2µ
1 D
− 1
2µ
i
Xii
Si
)∑
j
δ1−µij
(
Xjj
Xii
) 1
2
, i = {1, ..., n}
Di =
∑
j
δ1−µij X
1
2
jj
2 , i = {1, ..., n}
Bilateral trade flows, nominal incomes, price levels, and real incomes can then be recovered using
Xij = δ
1−µ
ij (XiiXjj)
1
2
Yi = (DiXii)
1
2
Pi =
(
Di
D1
) 1
2(1−µ)
yi =
Yi
Pi
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D. Sensitivity Analysis
Portugal Catalonia Basque Ireland Scotland
/Spain /rSpain /rSpain /UK /rUK
Calibrated δij 2.88 1.54 1.73 2.10 1.76
λi (data) 66.7% 34.9% 33.1% 24.8% 43.8%
λi (pol. exp.) 51.0% 52.7% 53.4%
∆real GNI: Independence -12.6% -15.3% -6.8%
∆real GNI: Autarky -13.4% -31.2% -32.6% -39.1% -25.5%
Independence / Autarky 40.4% 46.9% 26.7%
Table 8: Results using θ = 3.8 and k = 2.81 so that trade elasticity = −2.81
Portugal Catalonia Basque Ireland Scotland
/Spain /rSpain /rSpain /UK /rUK
Calibrated δij 1.77 1.26 1.35 1.49 1.36
λi (data) 66.7% 34.9% 33.1% 24.8% 43.8%
λi (pol. exp.) 51.6% 53.0% 53.3%
∆real GNI: Independence -7.2% -8.7% -3.7%
∆real GNI: Autarky -7.5% -18.3% -19.1% -23.5% -14.7%
Independence / Autarky 39.6% 45.3% 25.2%
Table 9: Results using θ = 3.8 and k = 4.58 so that trade elasticity = −5.21
Note that the Independence / Autarky figures are relatively insensitive to changes in the value of the
trade elasticity.
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